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Of Paternal, Political, and
Despotical Power, considered together.
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Sec. 169. THOUGH
I have had occasion to speak of
these separately before, yet the great mistakes of late about government, having, as I
suppose, arisen from confounding these distinct powers one with another, it may not,
perhaps, be amiss to consider them here together.
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Sec. 170. First, then, Paternal or parental power is nothing
but that which parents have over their children, to govern them for the children's good,
till they come to the use of reason, or a state of knowledge, wherein they may be supposed
capable to understand that rule, whether it be the law of nature, or the municipal law of
their country, they are to govern themselves by: capable, I say, to know it, as well as
several others, who live as freemen under that law. The affection and tenderness which God
hath planted in the breast of parents towards their children, makes it evident, that this
is not intended to be a severe arbitrary government, but only for the help, instruction,
and preservation of their offspring. But happen it as it will, there is, as I have proved,
no reason why it should be thought to extend to life and death, at any time, over their
children, more than over any body else; neither can there be any pretence why this
parental power should keep the child, when grown to a man, in subjection to the will of
his parents, any farther than having received life and education from his parents, obliges
him to respect, honour, gratitude, assistance and support, all his life, to both father
and mother. And thus, 'tis true, the paternal is a natural government, but not at all
extending itself to the ends and jurisdictions of that which is political. The power of
the father doth not reach at all to the property of the child, which is only in his own
disposing.
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Sec. 171. Secondly, Political power is that power, which
every man having in the state of nature, has given up into the hands of the society, and
therein to the governors, whom the society hath set over itself, with this express or
tacit trust, that it shall be employed for their good, and the preservation of their
property: now this power, which every man has in the state of nature, and which he parts
with to the society in all such cases where the society can secure him, is to use such
means, for the preserving of his own property, as he thinks good, and nature allows him;
and to punish the breach of the law of nature in others, so as (according to the best of
his reason) may most conduce to the preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind. So
that the end and measure of this power, when in every man's hands in the state of nature,
being the preservation of all of his society, that is, all mankind in general, it can have
no other end or measure, when in the hands of the magistrate, but to preserve the members
of that society in their lives, liberties, and possessions; and so cannot be an absolute,
arbitrary power over their lives and fortunes, which are as much as possible to be
preserved; but a power to make laws, and annex such penalties to them, as may tend to the
preservation of the whole, by cutting off those parts, and those only, which are so
corrupt, that they threaten the sound and healthy, without which no severity is lawful.
And this power has its original only from compact and agreement, and the mutual consent of
those who make up the community.
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Sec. 172. Thirdly, Despotical power is an absolute,
arbitrary power one man has over another, to take away his life, whenever he pleases. This
is a power, which neither nature gives, for it has made no such distinction between one
man and another; nor compact can convey: for man not having such an arbitrary power over
his own life, cannot give another man such a power over it; but it is the effect only of
forfeiture, which the aggressor makes of his own life, when he puts himself into the state
of war with another: for having quitted reason, which God hath given to be the rule
betwixt man and man, and the common bond whereby human kind is united into one fellowship
and society; and having renounced the way of peace which that teaches, and made use of the
force of war, to compass his unjust ends upon another, where he has no right; and so
revolting from his own kind to that of beasts, by making force, which is their's, to be
his rule of right, he renders himself liable to be destroyed by the injured person, and
the rest of mankind, that will join with him in the execution of justice, as any other
wild beast, or noxious brute, with whom mankind can have neither society nor security*.
And thus captives, taken in a just and lawful war, and such only, are subject to a
despotical power, which, as it arises not from compact, so neither is it capable of any,
but is the state of war continued: for what compact can be made with a man that is not
master of his own life? what condition can he perform? and if he be once allowed to be
master of his own life, the despotical, arbitrary power of his master ceases. He that is
master of himself, and his own life, has a right too to the means of preserving it; so
that as soon as compact enters, slavery ceases, and he so far quits his absolute power,
and puts an end to the state of war, who enters into conditions with his captive.
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(* Another copy corrected by Mr. Locke, has it thus, Noxious
brute that is destructive to their being.)
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Sec. 173. Nature gives the first of these, viz. paternal
power to parents for the benefit of their children during their minority, to supply their
want of ability, and understanding how to manage their property. (By property I must be
understood here, as in other places, to mean that property which men have in their persons
as well as goods.) Voluntary agreement gives the second, viz. political power to governors
for the benefit of their subjects, to secure them in the possession and use of their
properties. And forfeiture gives the third despotical power to lords for their own
benefit, over those who are stripped of all property.
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Sec. 174. He, that shall consider the distinct rise and
extent, and the different ends of these several powers, will plainly see, that paternal
power comes as far short of that of the magistrate, as despotical exceeds it; and that
absolute dominion, however placed, is so far from being one kind of civil society, that it
is as inconsistent with it, as slavery is with property. Paternal power is only where
minority makes the child incapable to manage his property; political, where men have
property in their own disposal; and despotical, over such as have no property at all.
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