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Of the Ends of Political Society
and Government.
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Sec. 123. IF
man in the state of nature be so
free, as has been said; if he be absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to
the greatest, and subject to no body, why will he part with his freedom? why will he give
up this empire, and subject himself to the dominion and controul of any other power? To
which it is obvious to answer, that though in the state of nature he hath such a right,
yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the invasion of
others: for all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no
strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state
is very unsafe, very unsecure. This makes him willing to quit a condition, which, however
free, is full of fears and continual dangers: and it is not without reason, that he seeks
out, and is willing to join in society with others, who are already united, or have a mind
to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call
by the general name, property.
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Sec. 124. The great and chief end, therefore, of men's
uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation
of their property. To which in the state of nature there are many things wanting.
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First, There wants an established, settled, known law,
received and allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the
common measure to decide all controversies between them: for though the law of nature be
plain and intelligible to all rational creatures; yet men being biassed by their interest,
as well as ignorant for want of study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding
to them in the application of it to their particular cases.
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Sec. 125. Secondly, In the state of nature there wants a
known and indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the
established law: for every one in that state being both judge and executioner of the law
of nature, men being partial to themselves, passion and revenge is very apt to carry them
too far, and with too much heat, in their own cases; as well as negligence, and
unconcernedness, to make them too remiss in other men's.
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Sec. 126. Thirdly, In the state of nature there often wants
power to back and support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution, They who
by any injustice offended, will seldom fail, where they are able, by force to make good
their injustice; such resistance many times makes the punishment dangerous, and frequently
destructive, to those who attempt it.
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Sec. 127. Thus mankind, notwithstanding all the privileges
of the state of nature, being but in an ill condition, while they remain in it, are
quickly driven into society. Hence it comes to pass, that we seldom find any number of men
live any time together in this state. The inconveniencies that they are therein exposed
to, by the irregular and uncertain exercise of the power every man has of punishing the
transgressions of others, make them take sanctuary under the established laws of
government, and therein seek the preservation of their property. It is this makes them so
willingly give up every one his single power of punishing, to be exercised by such alone,
as shall be appointed to it amongst them; and by such rules as the community, or those
authorized by them to that purpose, shall agree on. And in this we have the original right
and rise of both the legislative and executive power, as well as of the governments and
societies themselves.
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Sec. 128. For in the state of nature, to omit the liberty he
has of innocent delights, a man has two powers.
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The first is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the
preservation of himself, and others within the permission of the law of nature: by which
law, common to them all, he and all the rest of mankind are one community, make up one
society, distinct from all other creatures. And were it not for the corruption and
vitiousness of degenerate men, there would be no need of any other; no necessity that men
should separate from this great and natural community, and by positive agreements combine
into smaller and divided associations.
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The other power a man has in the state of nature, is the
power to punish the crimes committed against that law. Both these he gives up, when he
joins in a private, if I may so call it, or particular politic society, and incorporates
into any common-wealth, separate from the rest of mankind.
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Sec. 129. The first power, viz. of doing whatsoever he
thought for the preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind, he gives up to be
regulated by laws made by the society, so far forth as the preservation of himself, and
the rest of that society shall require; which laws of the society in many things confine
the liberty he had by the law of nature.
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Sec. 130. Secondly, The power of punishing he wholly gives
up, and engages his natural force, (which he might before employ in the execution of the
law of nature, by his own single authority, as he thought fit) to assist the executive
power of the society, as the law thereof shall require: for being now in a new state,
wherein he is to enjoy many conveniencies, from the labour, assistance, and society of
others in the same community, as well as protection from its whole strength; he is to part
also with as much of his natural liberty, in providing for himself, as the good,
prosperity, and safety of the society shall require; which is not only necessary, but
just, since the other members of the society do the like.
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Sec. 131. But though men, when they enter into society, give
up the equality, liberty, and executive power they had in the state of nature, into the
hands of the society, to be so far disposed of by the legislative, as the good of the
society shall require; yet it being only with an intention in every one the better to
preserve himself, his liberty and property; (for no rational creature can be supposed to
change his condition with an intention to be worse) the power of the society, or
legislative constituted by them, can never be supposed to extend farther, than the common
good; but is obliged to secure every one's property, by providing against those three
defects above mentioned, that made the state of nature so unsafe and uneasy. And so
whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any common-wealth, is bound to govern by
established standing laws, promulgated and known to the people, and not by extemporary
decrees; by indifferent and upright judges, who are to decide controversies by those laws;
and to employ the force of the community at home, only in the execution of such laws, or
abroad to prevent or redress foreign injuries, and secure the community from inroads and
invasion. And all this to be directed to no other end, but the peace, safety, and public
good of the people.
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