|
Campaign of 1776 |
Of the
operations of General Washington in New-York and New-Jersey. The battle on Long Island.
The retreat from York Island and through Jersey. The battles of Trenton and Princeton.
|
|
The evacuation of Boston varied
the scene, but did not lessen the labours of Washington. Henceforward he had a much more
formidable enemy to contend with. The royal army in Boston was, on a small scale,
calculated to awe the inhabitants of Massachusetts into obedience, but the campaign of
1776 was opened in New-York with a force far exceeding any thing hitherto seen in America.
Including the navy and army, it amounted to 55,000 men and was calculated on the idea of
reducing the whole United Colonies.
|
|
The operations contemplated
could be best carried on from the nearly central province of New-York, and the army could
be supplied with provisions from the adjacent islands, and easily defended by the British
navy. For these reasons, the evacuation of Boston, and the concentration of the royal
forces at New-York, had been for some time resolved upon in England.
|
|
The reasons that induced the
British to gain possession of New-York, weighed with Washington to prevent or delay it. He
had therefore detached largely from his army before Boston, and sent Gen. Lee to take the
command, and after providing for the security of Boston, proceeded soon after the
evacuation thereof with the main army to New-York, and made every preparation in his power
for its defence. Considerable time was allowed for this purpose; for Gen. Howe, instead of
pushing directly for New-York, retired to Halifax with the forces withdrawn from Boston.
He there waited for the promised reinforcements from England; but, impatient of delay,
sailed without them for New-York, and took possession of Staten Island in the latter end
of June.
|
|
He was soon followed by his
brother, Admiral Howe, and their whole force was assembled about the middle of July, and
in apparent readiness for opening the campaign. Before hostilities were commenced, the
British General and Admiral, in their quality of civil commissioners for effecting a
re-union between Great Britain and the Colonies, made an attempt at negotiation. To
introduce this business, they sent a flag ashore with a letter addressed to George
Washington, Esq. This he refused to receive, as not being addressed to him with the title
due to his rank, and at the same time wrote to Congress, "That he would not, on any
occasion, sacrifice essentials to punctilio, but in this instance, deemed it a duty to his
country to insist on that respect which, in any other than a public view, he would
willingly have waved."
|
|
Some time after, Adjutant
General Patterson was sent by Gen. Howe with a letter addressed to George Washington,
&c.&c.&c. On an interview, the Adjutant General, after expressing his high
esteem for the person and character of the American General, and declaring that it was not
intended to derogate from the respect due to his rank, expressed his hopes, that the et
ceteras would remove the impediments to their correspondence. Gen. Washington replied,
"That a letter directed to any person in a public character, should have some
description of it, otherwise it would appear a mere private letter; that it was true the
et ceteras implied every thing, but they also implied any thing, and that he should
therefore decline the receiving any letter directed to him as a private person, when it
related to his private station."
|
|
A long conference ensued, in
which the Adjutant General observed that "the Commissioners were armed with great
powers, and would be very happy in effecting an accommodation." He received for
answer, "that from what appeared, their powers were only to grant pardons; that they
who had committed no fault wanted no pardon."
|
|
On the arrival of Gen. Howe at
Staten Island, the American army did not exceed 10,000 men, but by sundry reinforcements
before the end of August, they amounted to 27,000. Of these a great part were militia, and
one-fourth of the whole was sick. The diseases incident to new troops prevailed
extensively, and were aggravated by a great deficiency in tents. These troops were so
judiciously distributed on York Island, Long Island, Governor's Island, Paulus Hook, and
on the Sound towards New Rochelle, East and West Chester, that the enemy were very
cautious in determining when or where to commence offensive operations. Every probable
point of debarkation was watched, and guarded with a force sufficient to embarrass, though
very insufficient to prevent, a landing.
|
|
From the arrival of the British
army at Staten Island, the Americans were in daily expectation of being attacked. General
Washington was therefore strenuous in preparing his troops for action. He tried every
expedient to kindle in their breasts the love of their country, an high toned indignation
against its invaders. In general orders he addressed them as follows: "The time is
now near at hand, which must probably determine whether Americans are to be freemen or
slaves; whether they are to have any property they can call their own; whether their
houses and farms are to be pillaged and destroyed, and themselves consigned to a state of
wretchedness, from which no human efforts will deliver them. The fate of unborn millions
will now depend, under God, on the conduct and courage of this army. Our cruel and
unrelenting enemy, leaves us only the choice of a brave resistance, or the most abject
submission.
|
|
"We have therefore to
resolve to conquer or to die. Our own, our country's honor, calls upon us for a vigorous
and manly exertion; and if we now shameful fail, we shall become infamous to the whole
world. Let us then rely on the goodness of our cause, and the aid of the Supreme Being, in
whose hands victory is, to animate and encourage us to great and noble actions. The eyes
of all our countrymen are now upon us, and we shall have their blessings and praises, if
happily we are the instruments of saving them from the tyranny mediated against them. Let
us therefore animate and encourage each other, and show the whole world that a freeman
contending for liberty on his own ground, is superior to any slavish mercenary on
earth."
|
|
When the whole reinforcements of
the enemy had arrived, Gen. Washington, in expectation of an immediate attack, again
addressed his army, and called on them to remember that :liberty, property, life, and
honour, were all at stake; that upon their courage and conduct, rested the hopes of their
bleeding and insulted country; that their wives, children, and parents, expected safety
from them only; and that they had every reason to believe that Heaven would crown with
success so just a cause."
|
|
He further added-- "The
enemy will endeavor to intimidate by show and appearance, but remember they have been
repulsed on various occasions by a few brave Americans. Their cause is bad-- their men are
conscious of it, and if opposed with firmness and coolness on their first onset, with our
advantage of works, and knowledge of the ground, the victory is most assuredly ours. Every
good soldier will be silent and attentive-- wait for orders-- and reserve his fire until
he is sure of doing execution: of this the officers are to be particularly careful."
|
|
He then gave the most explicit
orders that any soldier who should attempt to conceal himself, or retreat without orders,
should instantly be shot down, as an example of the punishment of cowardice, and desired
every officer to be particularly attentive to the conduct of his men, and report those who
should distinguish themselves by brave and noble actions. These he solemnly promised to
notice and reward.
|
|
On the 22d of August, the
greatest part of the British troops landed on Long Island. Washington immediately made a
farther effort to rouse his troops to deeds of valour. "The enemy," said
he,"have landed, and the hour is fast approaching on which the honour and success of
this army, and the safety of our bleeding country, depends. Remember, officers and
soldiers, that you are freemen, fighting for the blessings of Liberty; that slavery will
be your portion and that of your posterity, if you do not acquit yourselves like men.
Remember how your courage has been despised and traduced by your cruel invaders, though
they have found by dear experience at Boston, Charles-town, and other places, what a few
brave men, contending in their own land, and in the best of causes, can do against
hirelings and mercenaries. Be cool, but determined. Do not fire at a distance, but wait
for orders from your officers."
|
|
He repeated his injunctions,
"to shoot down any person who should misbehave in action," and his hope
"that none so infamous would be found, but that, on the contrary, each for himself
resolving to conquer or die, and trusting to the smiles of heaven on so just a cause,
would behave with bravery and resolution."
|
|
His assurance of rewards to
those who should distinguish themselves, were repeated; and he declared his confidence,
that if the army would but emulate and imitate their brave countrymen in other parts of
America, they would, by a glorious victory, save their country, and acquire to themselves
immortal honour."
|
|
On the 5th day after their
landing, the British attacked the Americans on Long Island, commanded by Gen. Sullivan.
The variety of ground and the different parties employed in different places, both in the
attack and defence, occasioned a succession of small engagements, pursuits, and slaughter,
which lasted for many hours.
|
|
The Americans were defeated in
all directions. The circumstances which eminently contributed to this, were the superior
discipline of the assailants, and the want of early intelligence of their movements. There
was not a single corps of Cavalry in the American army. The transmission of intelligence
was of course always slow, and often impracticable. From the want of it, some of their
detachments, while retreating before one portion of the enemy, were advancing towards
another, of whose movements they were ignorant.
|
|
In the height of the engagement
Washington passed over to Long Island, and with infinite regret saw the slaughter of his
best troops, but had not the power to prevent it; for had he drawn his whole force to
their support, he must have risked every thing on a single engagement. He adopted the
wiser plan of evacuating the island, with all the forces he could bring off. In
superintending this necessary, but difficult and dangerous movement, and the events of the
preceding day, Washington was indefatigable. For forty-eight hours he never closed his
eyes, and was almost constantly on horse-back. In less than thirteen hours, the field
artillery, tents, baggage, and about 9000 men, were conveyed from Long Island to the city
of New-York, over East River, and without the knowledge of the British, though not 600
yards distant. The darkness of the night and a heavy fog in the morning, together with a
fair wind after midnight, favoured this retreat. It was completed without interruption
some time after the dawning of the day.
|
|
The unsuccessful termination of
the late action, led to consequences more seriously alarming to the Americans, than the
loss of their men. Hitherto they had had such confidence in themselves, as engaged in the
cause of liberty and their country, that it outweighed all their apprehensions from the
exact discipline of the British troops; but now finding that many of them had been
encircled in inextricable difficulties from the superior military skill of their
adversaries, they went to the opposite extreme, and began to think but very indifferently
of themselves and their leaders, when opposed to disciplined troops. As often as they saw
the enemy approaching, they suspected a military maneuvre, from which they supposed
nothing could save them but immediate flight. Apprehensions of this kind might naturally
be expected from citizen soldiers, lately taken from agricultural pursuits, who expected
to lay aside the military character at the end of the current year.
|
|
Washington, tremblingly alive to
the state of his army, wrote to Congress on the sixth day after the defeat on Long Island,
as follows: "Our situation is truly distressing. The check our detachment lately
sustained has dispirited too great a proportion of our troops, and filled their minds with
apprehension and despair. The militia, instead of calling forth their utmost efforts to a
brave and manly opposition, in order to repair our losses, are dismayed, intractable, and
impatient to return. Great numbers of them have gone off; in some instances, almost by
whole regiments, in many by half ones, and by companies at a time. The circumstance of
itself, independent of others, when fronted by a well appointed enemy, superior in number
to our whole collected force, would be sufficiently disagreeable; but when it is added,
that their example has infected another part of the army; that their want of discipline
and refusal of almost every kind of restraint and government, have rendered a like conduct
but too common in the whole, and have produced an entire disregard of that order and
subordination which is necessary for an army, our condition is still more alarming; and
with the deepest concern I am obliged to confess my want of confidence in the generality
of the troops.
|
|
"All these circumstances
fully confirm the opinion I ever entertained, and which I more than once in my letters
took the liberty of mentioning to Congress, that no dependence could be put in a militia,
or other troops than those enlisted and embodied for a longer period than our regulations
have hitherto prescribed. I am fully convinced that our liberties must of necessity be
greatly hazarded, if not entirely lost, if their defence be left to any but a permanent
army.
|
|
"Nor would the expense
incident to the support of such a body of troops as would be competent to every exigency,
far exceed that which is incurred by calling in daily succours and new enlistments, which,
when effected, are not attended with any good consequences. Men who have been free and
subject to no control, cannot be reduced to order in an instant; and the privileges and
exemptions they claim, and will have, influence the conduct of others in such a manner,
that the aid derived from them is nearly counterbalanced by the disorder, irregularity,
and confusion they occasion."
|
|
In fourteen days after this
serious remonstrance, Congress resolved to raise 88 battalions to serve during the war.
Under these circumstances, to wear away the campaign with as little loss as possible, so
as to gain time to raise a permanent army against the next year, was to the Americans an
object of the greatest importance.
|
|
Gen. Washington, after much
deliberation, determined on a war of posts. Recent events confirmed him in the policy of
defending his country by retreating, when he could no longer stand his ground without
risking his army. He well knew that by adopting it he would subject himself to the
imputation of wanting energy and decision; but with him the love of country was paramount
to all other considerations.
|
|
In conformity to these
principles, the evacuation of New-York was about this time resolved upon, whensoever it
could no longer be maintained without risking the army. Arrangements were accordingly made
for a temporary defence, and an ultimate retreat when necessity required. The British, now
in possession of Long Island, could at pleasure pass over to York Island or the main.
Washington was apprehensive that they would land above him, cut off his retreat, and force
him to a general action on York Island. He therefore moved his public stores to Dobbs'
ferry, and stationed 12,000 men at the northern end of York Island. With the remainder he
kept up the semblance of defending New-York, though he had determined to abandon it,
rather than risk his army for its preservation.
|
|
While Washington was making
arrangements to save his troops and stores by evacuating and retreating, the British
commander was prosecuting his favourite scheme of forcing the Americans to a general
action, or breaking the communication between their posts. With this view he landed about
4000 men at Kipp's Bay, three miles above New-York, under cover of five men of war. Works
had been thrown up at this place, which were capable of being defended for some time, and
troops were stationed in them for that purpose; but they fled with precipitation without
waiting for the approach of the enemy. Two brigades were put in motion to support them.
Gen. Washington rode to the scene of action, and to his great mortification met the whole
party retreating. While he was exerting himself to rally them, on the appearance of a
small corps of the enemy, they again broke, and ran off in disorder.
|
|
Such dastardly conduct raised a
tempest in the usually tranquil mind of Gen. Washington. Having embarked in the American
cause from the purest principles, he viewed with infinite concern this shameful behaviour,
as threatening ruin to his country. He recollected the many declarations of Congress, of
the army, and of the inhabitants, preferring liberty to life, and death to dishonour, and
contrasted them with their present scandalous flight. His soul was harrowed up with
apprehensions that his country would be conquered, her army disgraced, and her liberties
destroyed. He anticipated, in imagination, that the Americans would appear to posterity in
the light of high sounding boasters, who blustered when danger was at a distance, but
shrunk at the shadow of opposition.
|
|
Extensive confiscations, and
numerous attainders, presented themselves in full view to his agitated mind. He saw in
imagination new formed states, with the means of defence in their hands, and the glorious
prospects of liberty before them, levelled to the dust; and such constitutions imposed on
them, as were likely to crush the vigor of the human mind; while the unsuccessful issue of
the present struggle would, for ages to come, deter posterity from the bold design of
asserting their rights. Impressed with these ideas, he hazarded his person for some for
considerable time in rear of his own men, and in front of the enemy, with his horse's head
towards the latter, as if in expectation that, by an honourable death, he might escape the
infamy he dreaded from the dastardly conduct of troops on whom he could place no
dependence. His aids, and the confidential friends around his person, by indirect
violence, compelled him to retire. In consequences of their address and importunity, a
life was saved for public service, which, otherwise, from a sense of honour and a gust of
passion, seemed to be devoted to almost certain destruction.
|
|
The shameful events of this day,
hastened the evacuation of New-York. This was effected with very little loss of men, but
all the heavy artillery and a large portion of the baggage, provisions, military stores,
and particularly the tents, were unavoidably left behind. The loss of the last mentioned
article was severely felt in that season, when cold weather was rapidly approaching.
|
|
The British having got
possession of the city of New York, advanced in front of it, and stretched their
encampments across York Island; while their shipping defended their flanks. Washington had
made his strongest post at Kingsbridge, as that preserved his communication with the
country. In front of this, and near to the British, he had a strong detachment posted in
an entrenched camp. This position of the two armies was particularly agreeable to him; for
he wished to accustom his raw troops to face their enemies, hoping that by frequent
skirmishes they would grow so familiar with the dangers incident to war, as to fear them
less.
|
|
Opportunities of making the
experiment soon occurred. On the day after the retreat from New-York, a skirmish took
place between an advanced detachment of the British army and some American troops,
commanded by Col. Knowlton, of Connecticut, and Major Leitch, of Virginia. Both these
officers fell, bravely fighting at the head of their troops. The Captains with their men
kept the ground, and fairly beat their adversaries from the field. This was the first
advantage the army under the command of Washington had gained in the campaign. Its
influence on the army was great. To increase its effects, the parole the next day was
"Leitch," and the General gave public thanks to the troops engaged therein. He
contrasted their conduct with the late shameful flight of the troops from the works on
Kipp's Bay, and observed-- "That the result proved what might be done, where officers
and men exerted themselves;" and again called on all "so to act as not to
disgrace the noble cause in which they were engaged."
|
|
General Howe continued to
prosecute his scheme for cutting off Washington's communication with the eastern states,
and enclosing him so as to compel a general engagement. With this view the royal army
landed on Frog's Neck in West-Chester county, and soon after advanced to New Rochelle, and
made sundry successive movements, all calculated to effect this purpose.
|
|
A few skirmishes took place, but
a general action was carefully avoided by Washington, except in one case, in which he had
such a manifest advantage from his position on hills near the White Plains, that Gen. Howe
declined it. The project of getting in the rear of the American army was in like manner
frustrated by frequent and judicious changes of its position. Gen. Howe failing in his
first design, adopted a new plan of operations. His efforts were henceforward directed to
an invasion of New Jersey. Washington, penetrating his designs, crossed the North River.
He wrote to William Livingston, governor of New Jersey, urging him to put the militia of
that State in the best state of preparation to defend their country, and also recommending
the removal of stock and provisions from the sea coast.
|
|
About this time Fort Washington
was taken by storm, and the garrison, consisting of more than 2000 men, with their
commander, Col. Magaw, surrendered prisoners of war. This was the only post held by the
Americans on York Island; and was exception to the general plan of evacuating and
retreating. Hopes had been indulged that it might be defended, and, in conjunction with
Fort Lee, on the opposite Jersey shore, made useful in embarrassing the passage of British
vessels up and down the North River. This post having fallen, orders for the evacuation of
Fort Lee were immediately given; But before the stores could be removed, Lord Cornwallis
crossed the North River with 6000 men. Washington, retreating before him, took post along
the Hackensack.
|
|
His situation there was nearly
similar to that which he had abandoned; for he was liable to be enclosed between the
Hackensack and the Pasaic rivers. He therefore, on the approach of the enemy, passed over
to Newark. He stood his ground there for some days, as if determined on resistance; but
being incapable of any effectual opposition, retreated to Brunswick, on the day Lord
Cornwallis entered Newark.
|
|
At Brunswick Washington kept his
troops in motion, and even advanced a small detachment, as if intending to engage the
enemy. Nor did he quit this position till their advanced guards were in sight. Lord
Stirling was left at Princeton with 1200 men, to watch the British; and Washington
proceeded with the residue to Trenton. There he meant to make a stand.
|
|
Orders were previously given to
collect and guard all the boats for 70 miles on the Delaware. The baggage and stores were
also passed over. These being secured, Washington detached 1200 men to Princeton, to keep
up the appearance of opposition, and soon followed with about 2000 militia men who had
recently joined him. Before he reached Princeton, intelligence was received that Lord
Cornwallis, strongly reinforced, was advancing from Brunswick in different directions,
with the apparent design of getting in his rear. An immediate retreat over the Delaware
became necessary. This was effected on the 8th of December.
|
|
Washington secured all his boats
on the Pennsylvania side; broke down the bridges on roads leading to the opposite shores,
and posted his troops at the different fording places. So keen was the pursuit, that as
the rear guard of the retreating army embarked, the van of the enemy came in sight.
|
|
The British having driven the
American army out of Jersey, posted themselves up and down the Delaware, and small parties
passed and repassed from one to the other, without any interruption. They made some
attempts to get boats, but failed. They also repaired some of the bridges that had been
recently destroyed, and pushed forward a strong detachment to Bordenton. This was intended
to increase their chances for crossing, and to embarrass Washington, who could not tell
from which of their several positions they would make the attempt.
|
|
Gen. Putnam was in the meantime
sent on to superintend the erection of lines of defence from the Schuylkill to the
Delaware, for the security of Philadelphia. Small redoubts were hastily thrown up to guard
the fording places; and Germantown was fixed upon as a place of rendezvous, in case the
British should cross and drive the Americans from their extended encampments on the
Delaware.
|
|
This retreat through the Jerseys
was attended with almost every circumstance that could occasion embarrassment or
depression. Washington was pressed with difficulties on all sides. In casting his eyes
around, he could not promise himself adequate support from any quarter. His gloomy
prospects were not brightened by any expectations, on the fulfillment of which he could
depend. Distrusting, but not despairing, he asked Col. Reed-- "Should we retreat to
the back parts of Pennsylvania, will the Pennsylvanians support us?"
|
|
The Colonel answered-- "If
the lower counties are subdued and give up, the back counties will do the same."
|
|
Washington nobly replied--
"We must retire to Augusta county, in Virginia. Numbers will be obliged to repair to
us for safety, and we must try what we can do, in carrying on a predatory war; and if
overpowered, we must cross the Alleghany mountains."
|
|
Gen. Washington had no cavalry
but a small corps of badly mounted Connecticut militia, and was almost equally destitute
of artillery, while conducting this retreat. It commenced in a few days after the
reduction of Fort Washington, in which the flower of the American army were made prisoners
of war. A great part of the retreating troops consisted of those who had garrisoned Fort
Lee. These had been compelled to abandon their post so suddenly, that they left behind
them their tents, blankets, and cooking utensils.
|
|
In this situation they
retreated, badly armed, worse clad, and in many instances barefooted, in the cold months
of November and December, through a desponding country, more disposed to seek safety by
submission than resistance. Under all these disadvantages, they performed a march of about
ninety miles, and had the address to prolong it to a space of nineteen days, that as much
time as possible might be gained for expected reinforcements to arrive. As they retreated
through the country, scarcely one of the inhabitants joined them; while numbers daily
flocked to the British army, and took the benefit of a royal proclamation issued at this
critical time, for pardoning all who, within sixty days, would return to the condition of
British subjects.
|
|
The small force which began this
retreat was daily lessening, by the expiration of the term of service for which they were
engaged. This terminated in November with many, and in December with nearly two-thirds of
the residue. No persuasions were availing to induce their continuance. They abandoned
their General, when the advancing enemy was nearly in sight. The Pennsylvania militia was
engaged to the first day of January, but they deserted in such numbers that it became
necessary to place guards at the ferries to stop them.
|
|
Two regiments had been ordered
from Ticonderoga to join Gen. Washington, but their term of service expired on the first
of December. They refused to re-enlist, and went off, to a man. Gen. Lee, who commanded
the eastern troops, was repeatedly ordered by Washington to cross the North River, and
join the retreating army; but these orders were not obeyed. While at a distance both from
his troops and the enemy, he was surpassed and taken prisoner by the British.
|
|
This begat suspicions, that.
despairing of the success of the Americans, he had chosen to abandon their service. Though
these apprehensions were without foundation, they produced the same mischievous effects on
the minds of the people as if they were realities. About the same time Congress thought it
expedient to leave Philadelphia and retire to Baltimore.
|
|
Under all these trying
circumstances, Washington was undismayed. He did not despair of the public safety. With
unconquerable firmness and the most perfect self-possession, he was always the same, and
constantly showed himself to his army with a serene and undisturbed countenance. Nothing
was omitted by him that could embarrass the enemy, or animate his army or country. He
forcibly pointed out to Congress the defective constitution of their army, without
cavalry, without artillery and engineers; and enlarged upon the impolicy of short
enlistments, and placing confidence in militia suddenly called out and frequently changed.
He urged these matters with great warmth; but to prevent offence, added-- "A
character to lose-- an estate to forfeit-- the inestimable blessing of liberty at stake--
and a life devoted, must be my excuse."
|
|
He also hinted at the propriety
of enlarging his powers so as to enable him to act in cases of urgency, without
application to Congress; but apologized for this liberty by declaring, "that he felt
no lust of power, and wished with the greatest fervency for an opportunity of turning the
sword into a ploughshare:" but added-- "his feelings as an officer and a man had
been such as to force him to say, that no person ever had a greater choice of difficulties
to contend with than himself."
|
|
In this very dangerous crisis,
Washington made every exertion to procure reinforcements to supply the place of those who
were daily leaving him. He sent Generals Mifflin and Armstrong to rouse the citizens of
Pennsylvania. Col. Reed was dispatched to Governor Livingston, to urge on him the
necessity of calling out the Jersey militia. These exertions were in a great measure
unavailing, except in and near the city of Philadelphia. Fifteen hundred of the citizens
of that metropolis associated together, and marched to the aid of Washington. Though most
of these were accustomed to the habits of a city life, they slept in tents, barns, and
sometimes in the open air, during the cold months of December and January.
|
|
On the capture of Gen. Lee, the
command of his army devolved on Gen. Sullivan, who, in obedience to the orders formerly
given, joined Gen. Washington. About the same time an addition was made to his force by
the arrival of a part of the northern army. The Americans now amounted to about 7000 men,
though during the retreat through the Jerseys, they were seldom equal to half that number.
The two armies were separated from each other by the river Delaware. The British, in the
security of conquest, cantoned their troops in Burlington, Bordenton, Trenton, and other
towns of New-Jersey, in daily expectation of being enabled to cross into Pennsylvania by
means of ice, which is generally formed about that time.
|
|
On receiving information of
their numbers and different cantonments, Washington observed-- "Now is the time to
clip their wings, when they are so spread." Yielding to his native spirit of
enterprise which had hitherto been repressed, he formed the bold design of re-crossing the
Delaware, and attacking the British posts on its eastern banks.
|
|
In the evening of Christmas day
he made arrangements for passing over in three divisions; at M'Konkey's ferry, at Trenton,
and at or near Bordentown. The troops which were to have crossed at the two last places
exerted themselves to get over, but failed from the quantity of ice which obstructed their
passage. The main body, about 2400 men, began to cross very early in the evening; but were
so retarded by ice that it was nearly four o'clock in the morning before they were in a
condition to take up their line of march on the Jersey side.
|
|
They were formed in two
divisions. One was ordered to proceed on the lower or river road; the other on the upper
or Pennington road. These having nearly the same distance to march, were ordered
immediately on forcing the out guards, to push directly into Trenton, that they might
charge the enemy before they had time to form. Though they marched different roads, yet
they arrived within three minutes of each other. The out guards of the Hessian troops at
Trenton soon fell back; but kept up a constant retreating fire. Their main body being hard
pressed by the Americans, who had already got possession of half their artillery,
attempted to file off by a road leading towards Princeton, but were checked by a body of
troops thrown in their way. Finding they were surrounded, they laid down their arms.
|
|
The number that submitted was 23
officers and 886 men. Between 30 and 40 of the Hessians were killed and wounded. Col. Rahl
was among the former, and seven of his officers among the latter. Captain Washington, of
the Virginia troops, and five or six of the Americans, were wounded. Two were killed, and
two or three were frozen to death. The detachment in Trenton consisted of the regiments of
Rahl, Losberg, and Kniphausen, amounting in the whole to about 1500 men, and a troop of
British light horse. All these were killed or captured, except about 600, who escaped by
the road leading to Bordenton.
|
|
The British had a strong
battalion of light infantry at Princeton, and a force yet remaining near the Delaware,
superior to the American army. Washington, therefore, in the evening of the same day,
thought it most prudent to cross into Pennsylvania with his prisoners. These being
secured, he recrossed the Delaware, and took possession of Trenton. The detachments which
had been distributed over New-Jersey previous to the capture of the Hessians, immediately
after that event assembled at Princeton, and were joined by the army from Brunswick under
Lord Cornwallis. From this position they came forward to Trenton in great force, hoping,
by a vigorous onset, to repair the injury their cause had sustained by the late defeat.
|
|
Truly delicate was the situation
of the feeble American army. To retreat was to hazard the city of Philadelphia, and to
destroy every ray of hope which began to dawn from their late success. To risk an action
with a superior force in front, and a river in rear, was dangerous in the extreme. To get
round the advanced party of the British, and, by pushing forwards, to attack in their
rear, was deemed preferable to either.
|
|
The British, on their advance
from Princeton, attacked a body of Americans which were posted with four field pieces a
little to the northward of Trenton, and compelled them to retreat. The pursuing British
being checked at the bridge over Sanpink creek by some field pieces, fell back so far as
to be out of their reach. The Americans were drawn up on the opposite side of the creek,
and in that position remained till night, cannonading the enemy and receiving their fire.
|
|
In this critical hour, two
armies, on which the success or failure of the American revolution materially depended,
were crowded into the small village of Trenton, and only separated by a creek, in many
places fordable.
|
|
The British, believing they had
all the advantages they could wish for, and that they could use them when they pleased,
discontinued all farther operations, and kept themselves in readiness to make the attack
next morning. But the next morning presented a scene as brilliant on the one side, as it
was unexpected on the other. Soon after it became dark, Washington ordered all his baggage
to be silently removed, and having left guards for the purpose of deception, marched with
his whole force by a circuitous route to Princeton. This maneuvre was determined upon in a
council of war, from a conviction that it would avoid the appearance of a retreat, and at
the same time the hazard of an action in a bad position, and that it was the most likely
way to preserve the city of Philadelphia from falling into the hands of the British.
|
|
Washington also presumed, that,
from an eagerness to efface the impressions made by the late capture of the Hessians at
Trenton, the British commanders had pushed forward their principal force; and that the
remainder in the rear at Princeton, was not more than equal to his own. The event more
than verified this conjecture. The more effectually to disguise the departure of the
Americans from Trenton, fires were lighted up in front of their camp. These not only gave
the appearance of going to rest, but, as flame cannot be seen through, concealed from the
British what was transacting behind them. In this relative position they were a pillar of
fire to the one army, and the pillar of a cloud to the other.
|
|
Providence favoured this
movement of the Americans. The weather had been for some time so warm and moist that the
ground was soft, and the roads so deep as to be scarcely passable; but the wind suddenly
changed to the northwest, and the ground in a short time was frozen so hard that when the
Americans took up their line of march, they were no more retarded than if they had been
upon a solid pavement.
|
|
Washington reached Princeton
early in the morning, and would have completely surprised the British, had not a party
which was on their way to Trenton descried his troops when they were about two miles
distant, and sent back couriers to alarm their unsuspecting soldiers in their rear. These
consisted of the 17th, the 40th, and 55th regiments of British infantry, and some of the
royal artillery, with two field pieces, and three troops of light dragoons. The centre of
the Americans, consisting of the Philadelphia militia, while on their line of march, was
briskly charged by a party of the British, and gave way in disorder.
|
|
The moment was critical.
Washington pushed forward, and placed himself between his own men and the British, with
his horse's head fronting the latter. The Americans, encouraged by his example and
exhortations, made a stand, and returned the British fire. The General, though between
both parties, was providentially uninjured by either. A party of the British fled into the
college, and were there attacked with field pieces, which were fired into it. The seat of
the muses became for some time the scene of action.
|
|
The party which had taken refuge
in the college, after receiving a few discharges from the American field pieces, came out
and surrendered themselves prisoners of war. In the course of the engagement sixty of the
British were killed, and a great number wounded, and about 300 of them taken prisoners.
The rest made their escape, some by pushing on to Trenton; others by returning to
Brunswick.
|
|
While they were fighting in
Princeton, the British in Trenton were under arms, and on the point of making an assault
on the evacuated camp of the Americans. With so much address had the movement to Princeton
been conducted, that though from the critical situation of the two armies every ear may be
supposed to have been open, and every watchfulness to have been employed, yet Washington
moved completely off the ground with his whole force, stores, baggage, and artillery,
unknown to and unsuspected by his adversaries. The British in Trenton were so entirely
deceived, that when they heard the report of the artillery at Princeton, though it was in
the depth of winter, they supposed it to be thunder.
|
|
The British, astonished at these
bold movements of an enemy supposed to be vanquished, instantly fell back with their whole
force, and abandoned every post they held to the southward of New-York, except Brunswick
and Amboy.
|
|
|
|
|
|
END OF CHAPTER THREE.
|
|
CONTINUE TO CHAPTER FOUR
|
|