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| The Executive Branch |
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It is not practicable for the
executive branch of government to be headed by anything other than a single person. The
President (or State Governor) has advisors in the form of heads of departments, but the
responsibility for all executive actions rests ultimately and finally on his own
shoulders.
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"The idea of separating
the executive business of the confederacy from Congress, as the judiciary is already in
some degree, is just and necessary." --Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, 1787. ME
6:131
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"To obtain a wise and an
able [State] government,... render the Executive a more desirable post to men of abilities
by making it more independent of the legislature." --Thomas Jefferson to Archibald
Stuart, 1791. ME 8:277
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"Leave the President free to
choose his own coadjutors, to pursue his own measures, and support him and them, even if
we think we are wiser than they, honester than they are, or possessing more enlarged
information of the state of things." --Thomas Jefferson to William Duane, 1811. ME
13:29
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"Responsibility weighs with
its heaviest force on a single head." --Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval, 1816.
ME 15:37
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"Let the [State] Executive
be chosen in the same way [as the Legislature] and for the same term, by those whose agent
he is to be; and leave no screen of a Council behind which to skulk from
responsibility." --Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval, 1816. ME 15:36
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"The preference of a plural
over a singular executive will probably not be assented to here." --Thomas Jefferson
to A. L. C. Destutt de Tracy, 1811. ME 13:15
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"Responsibility is a
tremendous engine in a free government. Let [the Executive] feel the whole weight of it
then by taking away the shelter of his Executive Council. Experience both ways has
established the superiority of this measure." --Thomas Jefferson to Archibald Stuart,
1791. ME 8:277
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"I had formerly looked with
great interest to the experiment which was going on in France of an Executive Directory,
while that of a single elective executive was under trial here. I thought the issue of
them might fairly decide the question between the two modes. But the untimely fate of that
establishment cut short the experiment. I have not, however, been satisfied whether the
dissensions of that Directory (and which I fear are incident to a plurality) were not the
most effective cause of the successful usurpations which overthrew them. It is certainly
one of the most interesting questions to a republican and worthy of great
consideration." --Thomas Jefferson to Augustus B. Woodward, 1809. ME 12:283
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"The experiment in France
failed after a short course, and not from any circumstance peculiar to the times or
nation, but from those internal jealousies and dissensions in the Directory, which will
ever arise among men equal in power, without a principal to decide and control their
differences." --Thomas Jefferson to A. L. C. Destutt de Tracy, 1811. ME 13:15
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"If experience has ever
taught a truth, it is that a plurality in the Supreme Executive will forever split in
discordant factions, distract the nation, annihilate its energies and force the nation to
rally under a single head, generally an usurper. We have, I think, fallen on the happiest
of all modes of constituting the Executive, that of easing and aiding our President by
permitting him to choose Secretaries of State, of Finance, of War and of the Navy, with
whom he may advise, either separately or all together, and remedy their divisions by
adopting or controlling their opinions at his discretion; this saves the nation from the
evils of a divided will and secures to it a steady march in the systematic course which
the President may have adopted for that of his administration." --Thomas Jefferson to
A. Coray, 1823. ME 15:485
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"The public knew well the
dissensions of the [first President's] Cabinet, but never had an uneasy thought on their
account, because they knew also they had provided a regulating power which would keep the
machine in steady movement." --Thomas Jefferson to A. L. C. Destutt de Tracy, 1811.
ME 13:17
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"The power of decision in
the President left no object for internal dissension, and external intrigue was stifled in
embryo by the knowledge which incendiaries possessed, that no division they could foment
would change the course of the executive power." --Thomas Jefferson to A. L. C.
Destutt de Tracy, 1811. ME 13:18
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"The form of a plurality,
however promising in theory, is impracticable with men constituted with the ordinary
passions." --Thomas Jefferson to A. L. C. Destutt de Tracy, 1811. ME 13:16
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"[That] plan [is] best, I
believe, [which] combines wisdom and practicability by providing a plurality of counselors
but a single Arbiter for ultimate decision." --Thomas Jefferson: Autobiography, 1821.
ME 1:81
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"I think history furnishes
as many examples of a single usurper arising out of a government by a plurality as of
temporary trust of power in a single hand rendered permanent by usurpation. I do not
believe, therefore, that this danger is lessened in the hands of a plural Executive.
Perhaps it is greatly increased by the state of inefficiency to which they are liable from
feuds and divisions among themselves." --Thomas Jefferson to A. L. C. Destutt de
Tracy, 1811. ME 13:18
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"Our government, although in
theory subject to be directed by the unadvised will of the President, is, and from its
origin has been, a very different thing in practice. The minor business in each department
is done by the Head of the department, on consultation with the President alone. But all
matters of importance or difficulty are submitted to all the Heads of departments
composing the cabinet; sometimes by the President's consulting them separately and
successively, as they happen to call on him; but in the greatest cases, by calling them
together, discussing the subject maturely, and finally taking the vote, in which the
President counts himself but as one. So that in all important cases the executive is, in
fact, a directory, which certainly the President might control; but of this there was
never an example, either in the first or the present administration. I have heard, indeed,
that my predecessor sometimes decided things against his council." --Thomas Jefferson
to William Short, 1807. ME 11:226
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"Aided by the counsels of a
cabinet of heads of departments... with whom the President consults, either singly or
altogether, he has the benefit of their wisdom and information, brings their views to one
center, and produces an unity of action and direction in all the branches of the
government." --Thomas Jefferson to A. L. C. Destutt de Tracy, 1811. ME 13:16
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"Consultation between the
President and the head of the department to which the matter belonged... is the way
everything is transacted which is not difficult as well as important." --Thomas
Jefferson to William Wirt, 1811. ME 13:53
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"The ordinary business of
every day is done by consultation between the President and the Head of the department
alone to which it belongs. For measures of importance or difficulty, a consultation is
held with the Head of departments, either assembled, or by taking their opinions
separately in conversation or in writing. The latter is most strictly in the spirit of the
Constitution, because the President, on weighing the advice of all, is left free to make
up an opinion for himself. In this way, they are not brought together, and it is not
necessarily known to any what opinion the others have given. This was General Washington's
practice for the first two or three years of his administration, till the affairs of
France and England threatened to embroil us, and rendered consideration and discussion
desirable." --Thomas Jefferson to Walter Jones, 1810. ME 12:371
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"I practised this last
method [i.e., assembled discussion], because the harmony was so cordial among us all, that
we never failed, by a contribution of mutual views on the subject, to form an opinion
acceptable to the whole. I think there never was one instance to the contrary, in any case
of consequence. Yet this does, in fact, transform the executive into a directory, and I
hold the other method to be more constitutional. It is better calculated, too, to prevent
collision and irritation, and to cure it, or at least suppress its effects when it has
already taken place." --Thomas Jefferson to Walter Jones, 1810. ME 12:371
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"The fact is, that in
ordinary affairs every head of a department consults me on those of his department, and
where anything arises too difficult or important to be decided between us, the
consultation becomes general." --Thomas Jefferson to William Duane, 1806. ME 11:96
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"Something now occurs almost
every day on which it is desirable to have the opinions of the Heads of departments, yet
to have a formal meeting every day would consume so much of their time as to seriously
obstruct their regular business. I have proposed to them, as most convenient for them and
wasting less of their time, to call on me at any moment of the day which suits their
separate convenience, when, besides any other business they may have to do, I can learn
their opinions separately on any matter which has occurred, also communicate the
information received daily." --Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, 1807. ME 11:267
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Departmental Responsibilities |
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"Acts involving war, or
proceedings which respect foreign nations, seem to belong either to the department of war,
or to that which is charged with the affairs of foreign nations; but I cannot possibly
conceive how the superintendence of the laws of neutrality, or the preservation of our
peace with foreign nations, can be ascribed to the department of the treasury, which I
suppose to comprehend merely matters of revenue. It would be to add a new and a large
field to a department already amply provided with business, patronage, and
influence." --Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph, 1793. ME 9:82
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"Conduct it ever so wisely,
[the management of the War Department] will be a sacrifice of [the person accepting it].
Were an angel from heaven to undertake that office, all our miscarriages would be ascribed
to him." --Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 1815. ME 14:229
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"The late mischievous law
vacating every four years nearly all the executive offices of the government... saps the
constitutional and salutary functions of the President, and introduces a principle of
intrigue and corruption which will soon leaven the mass, not only of Senators, but of
citizens. It is more baneful than the attempt which failed in the beginning of the
government to make all officers irremovable but with the consent of the Senate. This
places, every four years, all appointments under their power, and even obliges them to act
on every one nomination. It will keep in constant excitement all the hungry cormorants for
office, render them, as well as those in place, sycophants to their Senators, engage these
in eternal intrigue to turn out one and put in another, in cabals to swap work; and make
of them what all executive directories become, mere sinks of corruption and faction."
--Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, 1820. ME 15:294
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"[Do] not suppose that...
official communications will ever be seen or known out of the offices. Reserve as to all
their proceedings is the fundamental maxim of the Executive department." --Thomas
Jefferson to Benjamin Hawkins, 1800. ME 10:160
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"The time is coming when our
friends must enable us to hear everything, and expect us to say nothing; when we shall
need all their confidence that everything is doing which can be done, and when our
greatest praise shall be, that we appear to be doing nothing." --Thomas
Jefferson to William Duane, 1807. ME 11:290
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"It is essential for the
public interest that I should receive all the information possible respecting either
matters or persons connected with the public. To induce people to give this information,
they must feel assured that when deposited with me it is secret and sacred. Honest men
might justifiably withhold information, if they expected the communication would be made
public, and commit them to war with their neighbors and friends. This imposes the duty on
me of considering such information as mere suggestions for inquiry, and to put me on my
guard; and to injure no man by forming any opinion until the suggestion be verified. Long
experience in this school has by no means strengthened the disposition to believe too
easily. On the contrary, it has begotten an incredulity which leaves no one's character in
danger from any hasty conclusion." --Thomas Jefferson to John Smith, 1807. ME 11:203
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"Reserving the necessary
right of the President of the United States to decide, independently of all other
authority, what papers, coming to him as President, the public interests permit to be
communicated and to whom, I assure you of my readiness under that restriction, voluntarily
to furnish on all occasions, whatever the purposes of justice may require." --Thomas
Jefferson to George Hay, 1807. ME 11:228
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"I am persuaded the Court is
sensible, that paramount duties to the nation at large control the obligation of
compliance with their summons... at any place, other than the seat of government. To
comply with such calls would leave the nation without an executive branch, whose agency,
nevertheless, is understood to be so constantly necessary, that it is the sole branch
which the Constitution requires to be always in function. It could not then mean that it
should be withdrawn from its station by any co-ordinate authority." --Thomas
Jefferson to George Hay, 1807. ME 11:232
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"If the Constitution enjoins
on a particular officer to be always engaged in a particular set of duties imposed on him,
does not this supersede the general law subjecting him to minor duties inconsistent with
these? The Constitution enjoins his constant agency in the concerns of six millions of
people. Is the law paramount to this, which calls on him on behalf of a single one?"
--Thomas Jefferson to George Hay, 1807. ME 11:240
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"The leading principle of
our Constitution is the independence of the Legislature, Executive and Judiciary of each
other, and none are more jealous of this than the Judiciary. But would the Executive be
independent of the Judiciary if he were subject to the commands of the latter and
to imprisonment for disobedience; if the several courts could bandy him from pillar to
post, keep him constantly trudging from north to south and east to west, and withdraw him
entirely from his constitutional duties? The intention of the Constitution that each
branch should be independent of the others is further manifested by the means it has
furnished to each to protect itself from enterprises of force attempted on them by the
others, and to none has it given more effectual or diversified means than to the
Executive." --Thomas Jefferson to George Hay, 1807. ME 11:241
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"As I do not believe that
the district courts have a power of commanding the executive government to abandon
superior duties and attend on them, at whatever distance, I am unwilling, by any notice of
the subpoena, to set a precedent which might sanction a proceeding so preposterous."
--Thomas Jefferson to George Hay, 1807. ME 11:365
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"With respect to papers,
there is certainly a public and a private side to our offices. To the former belong grants
of land, patents for inventions, certain commissions, proclamations, and other papers
patent in their nature. To the other belong mere executive proceedings. All nations have
found it necessary, that for the advantageous conduct of their affairs, some of these
proceedings, at least, should remain known to their executive functionary only. He, of
course, from the nature of the case, must be the sole judge of which of them the public
interest will permit publication. Hence, under our Constitution, in requests of papers,
from the legislative to the executive branch, an exception is carefully expressed, as to
those which he may deem the public welfare may require not to be disclosed." --Thomas
Jefferson to George Hay, 1807. ME 11:232
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"The Executive ought to
communicate [to the House] such papers as the public good would permit, and ought to
refuse those, the disclosure of which would injure the public." --Thomas Jefferson:
The Anas, 1792. ME 1:304
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"The respect mutually due
between the constituted authorities, in their official intercourse, as well as sincere
dispositions to do for every one what is just, will always insure from the executive, in
exercising the duty of discrimination confided to him, the same candor and integrity to
which the nation has in like manner trusted in the disposal of its judiciary
authorities." --Thomas Jefferson to George Hay, 1807. ME 11:233
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The Office of Vice-President |
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"The second office of the
government is honorable and easy, the first is but a splendid misery." --Thomas
Jefferson to Elbridge Gerry, 1797. ME 9:381
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"I have ever thought the
post [of Vice-President] the most agreeable one the nation can give, and very far
preferable to that which its highest favor confers." --Thomas Jefferson to Elbridge
Gerry, 1813. ME 19:189
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"As to the second [office],
it is the only office in the world about which I am unable to decide in my own mind
whether I had rather have it or not have it. Pride does not enter into the estimate; for I
think with the Romans that the general of today should be a soldier tomorrow if
necessary." --Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, 1997. ME 9:358
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"As to duty, the
Constitution will know [the Vice-President] only as a member of a legislative body; and
its principle is, that of a separation of legislative, executive and judiciary functions,
except in cases specified. If this principle be not expressed in direct terms, yet it is
clearly the spirit of the Constitution, and it ought to be so commented and acted on by
every friend to free government." --Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, 1797. ME 9:368
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"I consider my office [of
Vice-President] as constitutionally confined to legislative functions, and... I could not
take any part whatever in executive consultations, even were it proposed." --Thomas
Jefferson to Elbridge Gerry, 1797. ME 9:383
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"After entering on the
office of Secretary of State, I recommended to General Washington to establish as a rule
of practice, that no person should be continued on foreign mission beyond an absence of
six, seven, or eight years... We return like foreigners, and, like them, require a
considerable residence here to become Americanized." --Thomas Jefferson to William
Short, 1801. ME 10:285
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The Powers of the Presidency |
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"As to the portions of power
within each State assigned to the General Government, the President is as much the
Executive of the State as their particular governor is in relation to State powers."
--Thomas Jefferson to John M. Goodenow, 1822. ME 15:383
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"The power of pardon,
committed to executive discretion,... could never be more properly exercised than where
citizens were suffering without the authority of law, or, which was equivalent, under a
law unauthorized by the Constitution, and therefore null." --Thomas Jefferson to
Spencer Roane, 1819. ME 15:214
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"I shall be ready to receive
and consider any testimony in [a criminal's] favor which his friends may bring forward,
and will do it on whatever I may believe to have been the intention of the Legislature in
confiding the power of pardon to the Executive." --Thomas Jefferson to Edmund
Randolph, 1808. ME 12:222
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"[We] are sensible that the
Legislature having made stripes a regular part of [a] punishment, that the pardoning them
cannot be a thing of course, as that would be to repeal the law, but that extraordinary
and singular considerations are necessary to entitle the criminal to that remission."
--Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph, 1808. ME 12:222
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"The Executive of the Union
is, indeed, by the Constitution, made the channel of communication between foreign
powers and the United States." --Thomas Jefferson to James Sullivan, 1807. ME 11:381
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"The transaction of business
with foreign nations is Executive altogether. It belongs, then, to the head of that
department except as to such portions of it as are specially submitted to the Senate.
Exceptions are to be construed strictly." --Thomas Jefferson: Opinion on Power of
Senate, 1790. ME 3:16
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"The Constitution [has] made
[the Senate's] advice necessary to confirm a treaty, but not to reject it." --Thomas
Jefferson to Spencer Roane, 1819. ME 15:215
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"[If a] question... under
[a] treaty [is] of Executive cognizance entirely and without appeal,... it is as much an
invasion of its independence for a coordinate branch to call for the reasons of the
decision as it would be to call on the Supreme Court for its reasons on any judiciary
decision... I cannot see to what legitimate objects any resolution of the House on the
subject can lead; and if one is passed on ground not legitimate, our duty will be to
resist it." --Thomas Jefferson William Branch Giles, 1802. FE 8:142
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"The President is bound to
stop at the limits prescribed by our Constitution and law to the authorities in his hands,
[and this] would apply in an occasion of peace as well as war. One of the limits is that
'no money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by
law,' and [if] no law [has] made any appropriation of money for any purpose similar to
[one contemplated, it would lie,] of course, beyond his constitutional powers."
--Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, 1806. FE 8:474
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"The Executive... has the
power, though not the right, to apply money contrary to its legal appropriations. Cases
may be imagined, however, where it should be their duty to do this. But they must be cases
of extreme necessity." --Thomas Jefferson to George Washington, 1793. FE 6:176
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| ME, FE = Memorial Edition, Ford Edition. |
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