| CHAPTER XI
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| AUTHORITY OF MAGNA CARTA |
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PROBABLY no political compact between king and people was ever entered
into in a manner to settle more authoritatively the fundamental law of a nation, than was
Magna Carta. Probably no people were ever more united and resolute in demanding from their
king a definite and unambiguous acknowledgment of their rights and liberties, than were
the English at that time. Probably no king was ever more completely stripped of all power
to maintain his throne, and at the same time resist the demands of his people, than was
John on the 15th day of June, 1215. Probably no king every consented, more deliberately or
explicitly, to hold his throne subject to specific and enumerated limitations upon his
power, than did John when he put his seal to the Great Charter of the Liberties of
England. And if any political compact between king and people was ever valid to settle the
liberties of the people, or to limit the power of the crown, that compact is now to be
found in Magna Carta. If, therefore, the constitutional authority of Magna Carta had
rested solely upon the compact of John with his people, that authority would have been
entitled to stand forever as the supreme law of the land, unless revoked by the will of
the people themselves.
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But the authority of Magna Carta does not rest alone upon the compact with John. When, in the next year, (1216,) his son, Henry III.,
came to the throne, the charter was ratified by him, and again in 1217, and again in 1225,
in substantially the same form, and especially without allowing any new powers,
legislative, judicial, or executive, to the king or his judges, and without detracting in
the least from the powers of the jury. And from the latter date to this, the charter has
remained unchanged.
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In the course of two hundred years the charter was confirmed by Henry and his
successors more than thirty times. And although they were guilty of numerous and almost
continual breaches of it, and were constantly seeking to evade it, yet such were the
spirit, vigilance and courage of the nation, that the kings held their thrones only on the
condition of their renewed and solemn promises of observance. And it was not until 1429,
(as will be more fully shown hereafter,) when a truce between themselves, and a formal
combination against the mass of the people, had been entered into, by the king, the
nobility, and the
"forty shilling
freeholders,"
(a class whom Mackintosh designates as "a few freeholders then accounted wealthy,"
[1]) by the exclusion of all others than such freeholders from all voice in the
election of knights to represent the counties in the House of Commons, that a repetition
of these confirmations of Magna Carta ceased to be demanded. and obtained. [2]
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The terms and the formalities of some of these "confirmations" make them
worthy of insertion at length.
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| Hume thus describes one which took place in the 38th year of Henry III. (1253): |
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" But as they (the barons) had experienced his (the king's) frequent breach of
promise, they required that he should ratify the Great Charter in a manner still more
authentic and solemn than any which he had hitherto employed. All the prelates and abbots
were assembled. They held burning tapers in their hands. The Great Charter was read before
them. They denounced the sentence of excommunication against every one who should
thenceforth violate that fundamental law. They threw their tapers on the ground, and
exclaimed,
May the soul of every one who incurs
this sentence so stink and corrupt in hell!
The king bore a part
in this ceremony, and subjoined, ' So help me God! I will keep all these articles
inviolate, as I am a man, as I am a Christian, as I am a knight, and as I am a king
crowned and anointed.' " –
Hume, ch. 12.
See also Blackstone's Introd. to the Charters. Black. Law Tracts, Oxford ed., p. 332.
Makintosh's Hist. of Eng., ch. 3. Lardner's Cab. Cyc., vol. 45, p. 233 – 4.
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| [1] Mackintosh's Hist. of Eng., ch. 3. 45 Lardner's Cab. Cyc., 354. |
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[2] "Forty shilling freeholders" were those "people dwelling and
resident in the same counties, whereof every one of them shall have free land or tenement
to the value of forty shillings by the year at the least above all charges." By
statute 8 Henry 6, ch. 7, (1429,) these freeholders only were allowed to vote for members
of Parliament from the counties.
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The following is the form of "the sentence of excommunication" referred to by
Hume:
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" The Sentence of Curse, Given by the Bishops, against the Breakers of the
Charters.
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"The year of our Lord a thousand two hundred and fifty-three, the third day of
May, in the great Hall of the King at Westminster,
in
the presence, and by the assent, of the Lord Henry, by the Grace of God King of England
, and the Lords Richard, Earl of Cornwall, his brother, Roger (Bigot) Earl of
Norfolk and Suffolk;, marshal of England, Humphrey, Earl of Hereford, Henry, Earl of
Oxford, John, Earl of Warwick, and other estates of the Realm of England: We, Boniface, by
the mercy of God Archbishop of Canterbury, Primate of all England, F. of London, H. of
Ely, S. of Worcester, F. of Lincoln, W. of Norwich, P. of Hereford, W. of Salisbury, W. of
Durham, R. of Exeter, M. of Carlisle, W. of Bath, E. of Rochester, T. of Saint David's,
Bishops, appareled in Pontificals, with tapers burning, against the breakers of the
Church's Liberties, and of the Liberties or free customs of the Realm of England, and
especially of those which are contained in the Charter of the Common Liberties of the
Realm, and the Charter of the Forest, have solemnly denounced the sentence of
Excommunication in this form. By the authority of Almighty God, the Father, the Son, and
the Holy Ghost, and of the glorious Mother of God, and perpetual Virgin Mary, of the
blessed Apostles Peter and Paul, and of all apostles, of the blessed Thomas, Archbishop
and Martyr, and of all martyrs, of blessed Edward of England, and of all Confessors and
virgins, and of all the saints of heaven: We excommunicate, accurse, and from the
thresholds (liminibus) of our Holy Mother the Church, We sequester, all those that
hereafter willingly and maliciously deprive or spoil the Church of her right: And all
those that by any craft or wiliness do violate, break, diminish, or change the Church's
Liberties, or the ancient approved customs of the Realm, and especially the Liberties and
free Customs contained in the Charters of the Common Liberties, and of the Forest,
conceded by our Lord the King, to Archbishops, Bishops, and other Prelates of England; and
likewise to the Earls, Barons, Knights, and other Freeholders of the Realm: And all that
secretly, or openly, by deed, word, or counsel,
do
make statutes, or observe them being made
, and that bring in
Customs, or keep them when they be brought in, against the said Liberties, or any of them,
the Writers and Counselors of said statutes, and the Executors of them, and a11 those that
shall presume to judge according to them. All and every which persons before mentioned,
that wittingly shall commit anything of the premises, let them well know that they incur
the aforesaid sentence,
ipso facto
, (i. e.. upon the deed being done.) And those that ignorantly do so, and be
admonished, except they reform themselves within fifteen days after the time of the
admonition, and make full satisfaction for that they have done, at the will of the
ordinary, shall be from that time forth included in the same sentence. And with the same
sentence we burden all those that presume to perturb the peace of our sovereign Lord the
King, and of the Realm. To the perpetual memory of which thing, We, the aforesaid
Prelates, have put our seals to these presents." –
Statutes of the Realm, vol. 1, p. 6. Ruffhead's Statutes, vol. 1, p. 20.
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One of the Confirmations of the Charters, by Edward I., was by statute, in the 25th
year of his reign, (1297,) in the following terms. The statute is usually entitled. "Confirmatio Cartarum,"
(Confirmation of the Charters.)
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Ch. 1. "Edward, by the Grace of God, King of England, Lord of Ireland, and Duke of
Guyan, To all those that these presents shall hear or see, Greeting. Know ye, that We, to
the honor of Cod, and of Holy Church, and to the profit of our Realm, have granted, for us
and our heirs, that the Charter of Liberties, and the Charter of the Forest, which were
made by common assent of all the Realm, in the time of King Henry our Father, shall be
kept in every point without breach. And we will that the same Charters shall be sent under
our seal, as well to our justices of the Forest, as to others, and to all Sheriff's of
shires, and to all our other officers, and to all our cities throughout the Realm,
together with our writs, in the which it shall he contained, that they cause the aforesaid
Charters to be published, and to declare to the people that We have confirmed them at all
points; and to our Justices, Sheriffs, mayors, and other ministers, which under us have
the Laws of our Land to guide, that they allow the same Charters, in all their points, in
pleas before them, and in judgment; that is, to wit, the Great Charter as the Common Law,
and the Charter of the Forest for the wealth of our Realm.
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Ch. 2. "And we will that if any judgment be given from henceforth contrary to the
points of the charters aforesaid by the justices, or by any others our ministers that hold
plea before them, against the points of the Charters, it shall be undone and holden for
naught.
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Ch. 3. "And we will, that the same Charters shall be sent, under our seal, to
Cathedral Churches throughout our Realms there to remain, and shall be read before the
people two times in the year.
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Ch. 4. "And that all Archbishops and Bishops shall pronounce the sentence of
excommunication against all those that by word, deed, or counsel, do contrary to the
foresaid charters, or that in any point break or undo them. And that the said Curses be
twice a year denounced and published by the prelates aforesaid. And if the same prelates,
or any of them, be remiss in the denunciation of the said sentences, the Archbishops of
Canterbury and York-, for the time being, shall compel and distrain them to make the
denunciation in the form aforesaid." –
St.
25 Edward I., (1297.). Statutes of the Realm, vol. l, p. 123.
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It is unnecessary to repeat the terms of the various confirmations, most of which were
less formal than those that have been given, though of course equally authoritative. Most
of them are brief, and in the form of a simple statute, or promise, to the effect that
"The Great Charter, and the Charter of the Forest, shall be firmly kept and
maintained in all points." They are to be found printed with the other statutes of
the realm. One of them, after having "again granted, renewed and confirmed" the
charters, requires as follows:
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"That the Charters be delivered to every sheriff of England under the king's seal,
to be read four times in the year before the people in the full county," (that is, at
the county court,) "that is, to wit, the next county (court) after the feast of Saint
Michael, and the next county (court) after Christmas, and at the next county (court) after
Easter, and at the next county (court) after the feast of Saint John "– 28 Edward I., ch. 1, (1300.)
v
Lingard says, "The Charter was ratified four times by Henry III., twice by Edward I.,
fifteen times by Edward III., seven times by Richard II., six times by Henry IV., and once
by Henry V.;" making thirty-five times in all. –
3 Lingard, 50, note, Philad. ed.
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| Coke says Magna Carta was confirmed thirty-two times. – Preface to 2 Inst., p. 6. |
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Lingard calls these "thirty-five successive ratifications" of the charter,
"a sufficient proof how much its provisions were abhorred by the sovereign, and how
highly they were prized by the nation." –
3
Lingard, 50.
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Mackintosh says, "For almost five centuries (that is, until 1688) it (Magna Carta)
was appealed to as the decisive authority on behalf of the people, though commonly so far
only as the necessities of each case demanded." – Mackintosh's Hist. of Eng. ch. 3. 45 Lardner's Cab. Cyc., 221.
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Coke, who has labored so hard to overthrow the most vital principles of Magna Carta,
and who, therefore, ought to be considered good authority when he speaks in its favor, [3]
says:
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"It is called Magna Carta, not that it is great in quantity, for there be many
voluminous charters commonly passed, specially in these later times, longer than this is;
nor comparatively in respect that it is greater than
Charta
de Foresta
, but in respect of the great importance and
weightiness of the matter, as hereafter shall appear; and likewise for the same cause
Charta de Foresta
; and both of them
are called
Magnae Char- tae Libertatum Angliae, (The Great Charters of the Liberties of England.)
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"And it is also called
Charta Libertatum
regni
, (Charter of the liberties of the kingdom;) and upon great
reason it is so called of the effect,
quia liberos
facit
, (because it makes men free.) Sometime for the same cause
(it is called)
communis libertas, (common liberty,) and
le chartre des
franchises
, (the charter of franchises.)
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"It was for the most part declaratory of the principal grounds of the fundamental
laws of England, and for the residue it is additional to supply some defects of the common
law.
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"Also, by the said act of 25 Edward I., (called Confirmatio Chartarum
,) it is adjudged in parliament
that the Great Charter and the Charter of the Forest shall be taken as the common law.
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" They (Magna Carta and Carta de Foresta) were, for the most part, but
declarations of the ancient common laws of England, to the observation and keeping
whereof, the king was bound and sworn.
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"After the making of Magna Charta, and Charta de Foresta, divers learned men in
the laws, that I may use the words of the record, kept schools of the law in the city of
London, and taught such as resorted to them the laws of the realm, taking their foundation
of Magna Charta and Charta de Foresta.
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[3] He probably speaks in its favor only to blind the eyes of the people to the
frauds he has attempted upon its true meaning.
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"And the said two charters have been confirmed, established, and commanded to be
put in execution by thirty-two several acts of parliament in all.
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"This appeareth partly by that which hath been said, for that it hath so often
been confirmed by the wise providence of so many acts of parliament.
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"And albeit judgments in the king's courts are of high regard in law, and judicia (judgments) are accounted as jurisdicta
, (the speech of the law
itself,) yet it is provided by act of parliament, that if any judgment be given contrary
to any of the points of the Great Charter and Charta de Foresta, by the justices, or by
any other of the king's ministers, &c., it shall be undone, and holden for naught.
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"And that both the said charters shall be sent under the great seal to all
cathedral churches throughout the realm, there to remain, and shall be read to the people
twice every year.
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"The highest and most binding laws are the statutes which are established by
parliament; and by authority of that highest court it is enacted (only to show their
tender care of Magna Carta and Carta de Foresta) that if any statute be made contrary to
the Great Charter, or the Charter of the Forest, that shall be holden for none; by which
words all former statutes made against either of those charters are now repealed; and the
nobles and great officers were to be sworn to the observation of Magna Charta and Charta
de Foresta.
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"Magna fuit quondam magnae reverentia
chartae."
(Great was formerly the reverence for Magna
Carta.) –
Coke's Proem to 2 Inst., p. 1 to 7.
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Coke also says, "All pretence of prerogative against Magna Charta is taken
away." – 2 Inst., 36.
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He also says, "That after this parliament
(52
Henry III., in 1267)
neither Magna Carta nor Carta de Foresta
was ever attempted to be impugned or questioned." –
2 Inst., 102. [4]
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[4] It will be noticed that Coke calls these confirmations of the charter
"acts of parliament," instead of acts of the king alone. This needs explanation.
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It was one of Coke's ridiculous pretences, that laws anciently enacted by the king,
at the
request, or with the consent, or by the advice
, of his parliament, was "an act
of parliament," instead of the act of the king. And in the extracts cited, he carries
this idea so far as to pretend that the various confirmations of the Great Charter were
"acts of parliament," instead of the acts of the kings. He might as well have
pretended that the original grant of the Charter was an "act of parliament;"
because it was not only granted at the request, and with the consent, and by the advice,
but on the compulsion even, of those who commonly constituted his parliaments. Yet this
did not make the grant of the charter "an act of parliament." It was simply an
act of the king.
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The object of Coke, in this pretence, was to furnish some color for the palpable
false- hood that the legislative authority, which parliament was trying to assume in his
own day, and which it finally succeeded in obtaining, had a precedent in the ancient
constitution of the kingdom.
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There would be as much reason in saying that, because the ancient kings were in the
habit of passing laws in special answer to the
petitions of their subjects, therefore those petitioners were a part of the legislative power of the kingdom. |
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One great objection to this argument of Coke, for the legislative authority of the
ancient parliaments, is that a very large – probably much the larger – number of
legislative acts were done without the advice, consent, request, or even presence, of a
parliament. Not only were many formal statutes passed without any mention of the consent
or advice of parliament, but a simple order of the king in council, or a simple
proclamation, writ, or letter under seal, issued by his command, had the same force as
what Coke calls "an act of parliament." And this practice continued, to a
considerable extent at least, down to Coke's own time.
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The kings were always in the habit of consulting their parliaments, more or less,
in regard to matters of legislation, – not because their consent was constitutionally
necessary, but in order to make influence in favor of their laws, and thus induce the
people to observe them, and the juries to enforce them.
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The general duties of the ancient parliaments were not legislative, but judicial,
as will be shown more fully hereafter. The
people
were not represented in the parliaments at the time of Magna Carta, but only the
archbishops, bishops, earls, barons, and knights; so that little or nothing would have
been gained for liberty by Coke's idea that parliament had a legislative power. He would
only have substituted an aristocracy for a king. Even after the Commons were represented
in parliament, they for some centuries appeared only as
petitioners, except in the matter of taxation, when their consent
was asked. And almost the only
source of their influence on legislation was this: that they would sometimes refuse their
consent to the taxation, unless the king would pass such laws as they petitioned for; or,
as would seem to have been much more frequently the case, unless he would abolish such
laws and practices as they remonstrated against.
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influence
, or power
of parliament, and especially of the Commons, in the
general
legislation of the country, was a thing of slow growth, having its origin in a
device of the king to get money contrary to law, (as will be seen in the next volume,) and
not at all a part of the constitution of the kingdom, nor having its foundation in the
consent of the people. The power, as
at present
exercised
, was not fully established until 1688, (near five hundred
years after Magna Carta,) when the House of Commons (falsely so called) had acquired such
influence as the representative,
not of the people,
but of the wealth
, of the nation, that they compelled, the king to
discard the oath fixed by the constitution of the kingdom; (which oath has been already
given in a former chapter, [5] and was, in substance, to preserve and execute the Common
Law, the Law of the Land, – or, in the words of the oath,
"the just laws and customs which the common people had chosen;"
) and to swear that he would "govern the people of this kingdom of England,
and the dominions thereto belonging, according
to the
statutes in parliament agreed on
, and the laws and customs of the
same." [6]
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The passage and enforcement of this statute, and the assumption of this oath by the
king, were plain violations of the English constitution, inasmuch as they abolished, so
far as such an oath could abolish, the legislative power of the king, and also "those
just
laws and customs which the
common people (through their juries) had chosen," and substituted the will of
parliament in their stead.
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Coke was a great advocate for the legislative power of parliament, as a means of
restraining the power of the king. As he denied all power to
juries
to decide upon the obligation of laws, and as he
held that the legislative power was
"so
transcendent and absolute as (that) it cannot be confined, either for causes or persons,
within any bounds,"
[7] he was perhaps honest in holding that
it was safer to trust this terrific power in the hands of parliament, than in the hands of
the king. His error consisted in holding that either the king or parliament had any such
power, or that they had any power at all to pass laws that should be binding upon a jury.
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These declarations of Coke, that the charter was confirmed by thirty-two "acts
of parliament," have a mischievous bearing in another respect. They tend to weaken
the authority of the charter, by conveying the impression that the charter itself might be
abolished by
"act of
parliament." Coke himself admits that it could not be revoked or rescinded by the
king
; for he says, "All pretence of
prerogative against Magna Carta is taken away." (2 Inst., 36.)
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| He knew perfectly well, and the whole English nation knew, that the
king
could not lawfully infringe Magna
Carta. Magna Carta, therefore, made it impossible that absolute power could ever be
practically established in England,
in the hands of
the king
. Hence, as Coke was an advocate for absolute power, –
that is, for a legislative power "so transcendent and absolute as (that) it cannot,
be confined, either for causes or persons, within any bounds," – there was no
alternative for him but to vest this absolute power in parliament. Had he not vested it in
parliament, he would have been obliged to abjure it altogether, and to confess that the
people,
through their juries
,
had the right to judge of the obligation of all legislation whatsoever; in other words,
that they had the right to confine the government within the limits of "those just
laws and customs which the common people (acting as jurors) had chosen." True to his
instincts, as a judge, and as a tyrant, he
assumed that this absolute power was vested in the hands of parliament.
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But the truth was that, as by the English constitution parliament had no authority
at all for
general
legislation,
it could no more confirm, than it could abolish, Magna Carta.
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These thirty-two confirmations of Magna Carta, which Coke speaks of as "acts
of parliament," were merely acts of the king. The parliaments, indeed, by refusing to
grant him money, except, on that condition, and otherwise, had contributed to oblige him
to make the confirmations; just as they had helped to oblige him by arms to grant the
charter in the first place. But the confirmations themselves were nevertheless
constitutionally, as well as formally, the acts of the king alone.
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| [5] See page 103. |
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St. 1.William and Mary, ch. 6, (1688) |
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4. Inst., 36. |
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To give all the evidence of the authority of Magna Carta, it would be necessary to give
the constitutional history of England since the year 1215. This history would show that
Magna Carta, although continually violated and evaded, was still acknowledged as law by
the government, and was held up by the people as the great standard and proof of their
rights and liberties. It would show also that the judicial tribunals,
whenever it suited their purposes to do so
, were in the habit of referring to Magna Carta as authority, in the same manner,
and with the same real or pretended veneration, with which American courts now refer to
the constitution of the United States, or the constitutions of the states. And, what is
equally to the point, it would show that these same tribunals, the mere tools of kings and
parliaments, would resort to the same artifices of assumption,
precedent
, construction, and false interpretation,
to evade the requirements of Magna Carta, and to emasculate it of all its power for the
preservation of liberty, that are resorted to by American courts to accomplish the same
work on our American constitutions. |
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I take it for granted, therefore, that if the authority of Magna Carta had rested
simply upon its character as a
compact
between the king and the people, it would have been forever binding upon the
king, (that is, upon the government, for the king was the government,) in his legislative,
judicial, and executive character; and that there was no
constitutional
possibility of his escaping from its
restraints, unless the people themselves should freely discharge him from them. |
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But the authority of Magna Carta does not rest, either wholly or mainly, upon its
character as a compact. For centuries before the charter was granted, its main principles
constituted "the Law of the Land," – the fundamental and constitutional law
of the realm, which the kings were sworn to maintain. And the principal benefit of the
charter was, that it contained a written description and acknowledgment, by the king
himself, of what the constitutional law of the kingdom was, which his coronation oath
bound him to observe. Previous to Magna Carta, this constitutional law rested mainly in
precedents, customs, and the memories of the people. And if the king could but make one
innovation upon this law, without arousing resistance, and being compelled to retreat from
his usurpation, he would cite that innovation as a precedent for another act of the same
kind; next, assert a custom; and, finally, raise a controversy as to what the Law of the
Land really was. The great object of the barons and people, in demanding from the king a
written description and
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acknowledgment of the Law of the Land, was to put an end to all disputes of this kind,
and to put it out of the power of the king to plead any misunderstanding of the
constitutional law of the kingdom. And the charter, no doubt, accomplished very much in
this way. After Magna Carta, it required much more audacity, cunning, or strength, on the
part of the king, than it had before, to invade the people's liberties with impunity.
Still, Magna Carta, like all other written constitutions, proved inadequate to the full
accomplishment of its purpose; for when did a parchment ever have power adequately to
restrain a government, that had either cunning to evade its requirements, or strength to
overcome those who attempted its defence? The work of usurpation, therefore, though
seriously checked, still went on, to a great extent, after Magna Carta. Innovations upon
the Law of the Land are still made by the government. One innovation was cited as a
precedent; precedents made customs; and customs became laws, so far as practice was
concerned; until the government, composed of the king, the high functionaries of the
church, the nobility, a House of Commons representing the "forty shilling
freeholders," and a dependent and servile judiciary, all acting in conspiracy against
the mass of the people, became practically absolute, as it is at this day.
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As proof that Magna Carta embraced little else than what was previously recognized as
the common law, or Law of the Land, I repeat some authorities that have been already
cited.
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Crabbe says, "It is admitted on all hands that it (Magna Carta) contains nothing
but what was confirmatory of the common law and the ancient usages of the realm; and is,
properly speaking, only an enlargement of the charter of Henry I. and his
successors." –
Crabbe's Hist. of the Eng. Law,
p. 127.
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Blackstone says, "It is agreed by all our historians that the Great Charter of
King John was, for the most part, compiled from the ancient customs of the realm, or the
laws of Edward the Confessor; by which they mean the old common law which was established
under our Saxon princes." –
Blackstone's
Introd. to the Charters. See Blackstone's Law Tracts, Oxford ed., p. 289.
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Coke says, " The common law is the most general and ancient law of the realm...
The common law appeareth in the statute of Magna Carta,
and other ancient statutes, (which for the most part are affirmations of the common law,)
in the original writs, in judicial records, and in our books of terms and years."
– 1 Inst., 115 b.
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Coke also says, "It (Magna Carta) was for the most part declaratory of the
principal grounds of the fundamental laws of England, and for the residue it was
additional to supply some defects of the common law... They (Magna Carta and Carta de
Foresta) were, for the most part, but declarations of the ancient common laws of England,
to the observation and keeping whereof the king was bound and
sworn."
–
Preface to 2 Inst., p. 3
and 5.
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Hume says, "We may now, from the tenor of this charter, (Magna Carta,) conjecture
what those laws were of King Edward, (the Confessor,) which the English nation during so
many generations still desired, with such an obstinate perseverance, to have recalled and
established. They were chiefly these latter articles of Magna Carta; and the barons who,
at the beginning of these commotions, demanded the revival of the Saxon laws, undoubtedly
thought that they had sufficiently satisfied the people, by procuring them this
concession, which comprehended the principal objects to which they had so long
aspired." – Hume, ch. 11.
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Edward the First confessed that the Great Charter was substantially identical with the
common law, as far as it went, when he commanded his justices to allow "the Great
Charter as the Common Law," " in pleas before them, and in judgment," as
has been already cited in this chapter. –
25 Edward
I., ch. 1, (1297.)
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In conclusion of this chapter, it may be safely asserted that the veneration,
attachment, and pride, which the English nation, for more than six centuries, have felt
towards Magna Carta, are in their nature among the most irrefragable of all proofs that it
was the fundamental law of the land, and constitutionally binding upon the government;
for, otherwise, it would have been, in their eyes, an unimportant and worthless thing.
What those sentiments were I will use the words of others to describe, – the words,
too, of men, who, like all modern authors who have written on the same topic, had utterly
inadequate ideas of the true character of the instrument on which they lavished their
eulogiums.
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204
Hume, speaking of the Great Charter and the Charter of the Forest, as they were
confirmed by Henry III., in 1217, says:
"Thus these famous charters were brought nearly to the shape in which they have ever
since stood; and they were, during many generations, the peculiar favorites of the English
nation, and esteemed the most sacred rampart to national liberty and independence. As they
secured the rights of all orders of men, they were anxiously defended by all, and became
the basis, in a manner, of the English monarchy, and a kind of original contract, which
both limited the authority of the king and ensured the conditional allegiance of his
subjects. Though often violated, they were still claimed by the nobility and people; and,
as no precedents were supposed valid that infringed them, they rather acquired than lost
authority, from the frequent attempts made against them in several ages, by regal and
arbitrary power." – Hume, ch. 12.
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Mackintosh says,
"It was understood by the simplest of the unlettered age for whom it was intended. It
was remembered by them... For almost five centuries it was appealed to as the decisive
authority on behalf of the people... To have produced it, to have preserved it, to have
matured it, constitute the immortal claim of England on the esteem of mankind. Her Bacons
arid Shakspeares, her Miltons and Newtons, with all the truth which they have revealed,
and all the generous virtues which they have inspired, are of inferior value when compared
with the subjection of men and their rulers to the principles of justice; if, indeed, it
be not more true that these mighty spirits could not have been formed except under equal
laws, nor roused to full activity without the influence of that spirit which the Great
Charter breathed over their forefathers." –
Mackintosh's
Hist. of Eng., ch. 3,
[8]
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Of the Great Charter, the trial by jury is the vital part, and the only part that
places the liberties of the people in their own keeping. Of this Blackstone says:
"The trial by jury, or the country, per patriam,
is also that trial by the peers of every Englishman, which, as the grand bulwark of his
liberties, is secured to him by the Great Charter;
nullus
liber homo capiatur, vel imprisonetur, aut exuletur, aut aliquo modo destruatur, nisi per
legale judicial parium suorum, vel per legem terrae.
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| [8] Under the head of "John." |
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| 205 |
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The liberties of England cannot but subsist so long as this palladium remains sacred
and inviolate, not only from all open, attacks, which none will be so hardy as to make,
but also from all secret machinations which may sap and undermine it." [9]
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"The trial by jury ever has been, and I trust ever will be, looked upon as the
glory of the English law... It is the most transcendent privilege which any subject can
enjoy or wish for, that he cannot be affected in his property, his liberty, or his person,
but by the unanimous consent of twelve of his neighbors and equals."[10]
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Hume calls the Trial by Jury "An
institution admirable in itself, and the best calculated for the preservation of liberty
and the administration of justice, that ever was devised by the wit of man."[11]
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An old book, called "English Liberties," says:
"English Parliaments have all along been most zealous for preserving this Great Jewel of Liberty, Trials by Juries having no
less than fifty-eight several times, since the Norman Conquest, been established and
confirmed by the legislative power, no one privilege besides having been ever so often
remembered in parliament." [12]
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| [9] 4 Blackstone, 849-50. |
| [10] 3 Blackstone, 379. |
| [11] Hume, ch. 2. |
| [12] Page 203, 5th edition, 1721. |
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