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This volume, it is presumed by the author, gives what will
generally be considered satisfactory evidence,– though not all the evidence,– of
what the Common Law trial by jury really is. In a future volume, if it should be called
for, it is designed to corroborate the grounds taken in this; give a concise view of the
English constitution; show the unconstitutional character of the existing government in
England, and the unconstitutional means by which the trial by jury has been broken down in
practice; prove that, neither in England nor the United States, have legislatures ever
been invested by the people with any authority to impair the powers, change the oaths, or
(with few exceptions) abridge the jurisdiction, of juries, or select jurors on any other
than Common Law principles; and, consequently, that, in both countries, legislation is
still constitutionally subordinate to the discretion and consciences of Common Law juries,
in all cases, both civil and criminal, in which juries sit. The same volume will probably
also discuss several political and legal questions, which will naturally assume importance
if the trial by jury should be reestablished.
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